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Abstract : This paper aims to fill in the gap in research on the effect of
pharmaceutical lobbying on drug reimbursement policy, particularly in
Poland, a post-communist country. To this end, we conducted in-depth,
semi-structured, anonymous, elite interviews in Poland, supplemented by
a review of legislation, policy documents, official reports and press articles,
as well as observations. Overall, 109 representatives of stakeholders involved
in reimbursement policy were interviewed. We identified two key lobbying
methods: informal persuasion and third-party endorsements. These methods
are coupled with two supplementary ones: lobbying through parliament and
ministries, as well as diplomatic pressure. Pharmaceutical lobbying methods
in Poland clearly resemble those used in other European countries. What is
notable about the Polish case is extensive reliance on informal lobbying
and diplomatic pressure.
1. Introduction
The recent heated debate about publically funded purchases of swine flu
vaccinations shows that pharmaceutical lobbying is a pivotal topic in health
policy in Europe (Nicoll and McKee, 2010). Their most prominent critics (e.g.
Angell, 2005) allege that drug companies often use unethical lobbying methods
that lead to sub-optimal treatment outcomes and a substantial waste of resources
(Cohen and Carter, 2010). More broadly, pharmaceutical lobbying is said to
contribute to unwanted social phenomena such as medicalisation (Conrad, 2007),
disease mongering (Moynihan et al., 2003) and pharmaceuticalisation (Abraham,
2010).
*Correspondence to: Dr. Lawrence King, Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge, Free School
Lane, Cambridge, CB2 3RQ, UK. Email: lk285@cam.ac.uk
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Policy analyses of pharmaceutical lobbying to date have focused largely on
drug regulation, particularly registration of medicines with drug regulatory
agencies (Abraham and Lewis, 2000; Abraham, 2002). In our view, this
literature understates the fact that the successful registration of a medicine
is only the initial step in drug companies’ efforts to achieve a sufficient volume
of sales to guarantee a large profit. Separately, research has examined the role
of pharmaceutical marketing targeted at physicians (Moynihan, 2003; Oldani,
2004; Health Committee, 2005: 58). However, these areas of study are inex-
tricably linked, as doctors’ prescribing decisions, especially those concerning
new and expensive therapies, are increasingly shaped by policy developments in
the field of drug reimbursement (Abraham, 2009: 951–959).
In this paper, we examine pharmaceutical lobbying as it relates to policies on
reimbursement for ‘innovative’ medicines in Poland. As in the rest of Europe,
new and expensive drugs cannot reach a mass market unless they are included in
state-funded reimbursement schemes. Tellingly, lobbying figures as an important
tool in the ‘market access’ strategy adopted in recent years by major global drug
companies with support from governments (Tiedemann, 2009; Burson-Marsteller,
2010). Yet, the role of pharmaceutical lobbying in drug reimbursement decisions
has not been sufficiently recognised in the literature (notable exceptions include
Vuorenkoski et al., 2003; Abraham, 2009). However, we can gain some insights
from another European Union (EU) member state, the United Kingdom, where
pharmaceutical lobbying methods have been examined in depth over many years.
Pharmaceutical lobbying in the UK is largely premised on using seemingly inde-
pendent ‘third parties’ to endorse policy choices favourable for drug companies.
Specifically, two seminal debates hosted by British Medical Journal (BMJ) showed
that drug companies pay particular attention to co-opting and securing policy
support of Key Opinion Leaders (KOLs) in the medical milieu (Buckwell, 2008;
Fava, 2008; Moynihan, 2008; Cohen and Carter, 2010), and that of patient
organisations (Herxheimer, 2003; Kent, 2007; Mintzes, 2007; see also Health
Committee, 2005: 74–77). Another vital form of pharmaceutical lobbying, aimed
at reaching policymakers through appealing to public opinion, involves generating
media coverage of illnesses as well as treatment options (Wilson et al., 2008). Apart
from the ‘third parties’, drug companies encourage ‘political influencers’ such as
members of parliament to exert pressure on decision-makers at the National
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence and the Department of Health (The
Lancet Editors, 2005; Berrett et al., 2006; Ferner and McDowell, 2006). Impor-
tantly for our purposes, reports from other European countries, although in less
detail, indicate that this is the usual model (Garcı´a-Sempere and Artell, 2005;
Traufetter, 2009; Choukroun, 2010; Hemminki et al., 2010; Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2010; Payet, 2010). It is vital to ascertain
whether pharmaceutical lobbying methods identified in the pre-2004 EU are also
seen in the post-communist new member states. Given the extremely limited
research on this region (Koprˇivova´, 2007), it is methodologically justified to select
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Poland as a prototypical case study (Hague and Harrop, 1992: 24–25). Crucially,
Poland is the largest pharmaceutical market in Central and Eastern Europe (IMS
Health and Rynek Zdrowia, 2010) and an increasingly important player globally.
According to the General Manager of Intercontinental Medical Statistics (IMS)
Poland, ‘‘[W]e notice the increase in the significance of emerging economies in
shaping the global balance of power in the pharmaceutical sector. Poland belongs to
the group of countries whose importance will continue to grow’’ (Zarzycki, 2010).
The Polish health-care system is dominated by the Ministry of Health (MoH –
Ministerstwo Zdrowia), which is the regulator of health care, and the National
Health Found (NHF – Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia), which manages the
health-care insurance scheme. In drug reimbursement policy, the respective roles
of the two actors have been evolving over the last ten years and are not entirely
formally specified. It can be argued, however, that the primary responsibility
of the MoH is shaping the policy content, while the NHF provides funding for
therapies selected by the MoH.
Two major state reimbursement schemes exist in Poland: open reimbursement
(refundacja otwarta) and therapeutic programmes (programy terapeutyczne). The
former concerns prescription-only (Rx) medicines obtained by patients at a
pharmacy for up to 50% of their original price, whereas the latter refers to
therapies provided by hospitals, free of charge, for narrowly defined groups of
patients, particularly those suffering from rare diseases or selected types of cancer.
Open reimbursement is institutionalised in the form of ‘reimbursement lists’ (listy
refundacyjne), issued periodically as a regulation of the Minister of Health. A
therapeutic programme usually consists of one to three drug therapies to treat a
specific condition and is published as a regulation of the Minister of Health (until
2009, in regulations of the President of the NHF). Unlike reimbursement lists that
are dominated by generic drugs, therapeutic programmes comprise exclusively
innovative drugs.
In this paper, we focus on therapeutic programmes as they are highly attractive for
innovative drug companies. This is illustrated by the fact that over the last 7 years
expenses on therapeutic programmes have risen 601.58% in real USD1 (Table 1).
2. Methods
The fieldwork for this article was conducted between February 2009 and April
2010 by P.O. in collaboration with L.K. The bulk of the data were collected by
means of in-depth, semi-structured, anonymous, elite interviews with repre-
sentatives of major stakeholders in the domain of drug reimbursement policy in
Poland (Table 2).
1 We present the expenses in both Polish Z"otys (PLN) and USD because the amount of drugs that the
NHF can purchase from multinational drug companies largely depends on the strength of the local
currency. We calculated the average yearly exchange rates based on the data published by the National
Bank of Poland (http://www.nbp.pl/home.aspx?c5/ascx/archa.ascx).
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The initial phase of the fieldwork involved interviewing a purposive sample of
representatives of organisations engaged directly and indirectly in shaping
reimbursement policy. Overall, out of 70 interview requests 57 were successful
(the non-response rate was 22.81%). The largest category of non-respondents
Table 1. Expenses on therapeutic programmes
Year
Number of therapeutic
programmes Expenses (PLN)
Real yearly
growth (%) Expenses (USD)
Real yearly
growth (%)
2004 N/A 278,389,333.30 – 76,305,209.87 –
2005 44 588,983,995.46 107.05 182,136,189.45 130.86
2006 36 618,449,830.00 3.65 199,159,639.16 5.93
2007 40 735,422,990.00 16.08 265,576,487.72 29.65
2008 37 867,321,380.00 13.22 360,467,837.51 30.71
2009 35 1,091,849,000.00 21.28 394,289,308.98 9.77
2010
(projection)
N/A 1,643,210,000.00 46.71 544,123,865.57 35.77
PLN5Polish Z"otys; N/A5 not applicable.
Sources: Narodowy Fundusz Zdrowia, 2006: 20–21, 2007: 24–25, 2008: 31–32, 2009: 32, 2010a: 53,
2010b; OECD, 2011.
Table 2. Categories of interviewees
Organisation Number of interviews
Ministry of Health 21
National and regional consultants 4
National Health Fund 3
The Agency for HTA 8
Parliament 8
Innovative pharmaceutical companies 17
Associations of innovative drug companies 2
Associations of generic drug companies 3
Chamber of commerce-associating drug companies 1
American Embassy 1
Law firms 4
Lobbying firms 3
Freelance lobbyist 1
Public relations firms 4
HTA firms 2
Contract research organisation 2
Pharmaceutical market consultancies 2
Patients’ organisations 7
Journalists 6
Medical doctors dealing with drug reimbursement in their professional activity 10
Total 109
HTA5Health Technology Assessment.
178 P I O T R O Z I E R A N´ S K I E T A L .
(n55) were employees of innovative drug companies (three communications
managers, a public affairs director and a former corporate affairs director). To
establish contacts with the under-represented categories of interviewees, especially
employees of drug companies and middle-ranking public officials, snowball
sampling was subsequently used. This also proved vital in gaining access to highly
knowledgeable interviewees without organisational affiliations (for instance, an
extremely experienced freelance lobbyist with no institutional email address) and
those currently on leave from work. In the snowball-sampling phase, the response
rate was 100% – all 26 interview requests were successful. In total, 83 people were
interviewed, yet the number of interviews was 109, as 20 people played the role of
key informants (Malinowski, 2002) and were interviewed twice, and three people
were interviewed three times. Two interviewees were asked about their two
separate professional roles and, in these cases, we treated the corresponding
questions as separate interviews. Crucially, the characteristics of multiple respon-
dents did not bias the purposive sample, as they were relatively evenly spread
among all categories of interviewees. For example, the people interviewed three
times were an Agency for Health Technology Assessment (AHTA) official, a high-
ranking MoH official and the key account manager from a drug company.
Using open questions, we asked our interviewees to reconstruct the prevalent
methods of pharmaceutical lobbying and to evaluate their effectiveness. The
interviews were conducted in Polish and typically lasted approximately 1 hour.
The interviewing took place in line with the ethical guidelines of American
Sociological Association (American Sociological Association, 1999). All inter-
viewees were briefed about the broad goal of the study and gave informed verbal
consent to participate in it. Furthermore, we took particular care to ensure their
anonymity in presenting our data as citations. For instance, bearing in mind that
in several instances the number of people occupying a given organisational
position is very small, we created relatively broad interviewee categories (e.g.
‘middle-ranking’ or ‘high-ranking officials’).
To strengthen the validity of our findings, we triangulated our interview
data (Silverman, 1993: 156–158) with additional data sources: reimbursement
legislation, policy documents (Ministerstwo Zdrowia, 2004, 2005), Supreme
Chamber of Control reports on reimbursement policy (Najwyz˙sza Izba Kontroli,
2004, 2007, 2009) and articles from the daily and specialised press on phar-
maceutical lobbying.2 Furthermore, we conducted observations of two disease-
awareness campaigns organised by an innovative drug company specifically
to gain an additional perspective on relationships between drug companies,
KOLs and patient organisations.
One of the researchers (P.O.) performed standard procedures of content analysis
(Kvale, 1996) facilitated by a computer programme (Atlas.ti 6.2). This involved
2 We will make no references to specific publications, as sometimes drug companies threaten to sue
journalists writing about their products in the context of lobbying scandals.
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using a deductive–inductive approach to coding. The main codes were generated
from research questions, while ‘open’ and ‘in vivo’ coding was applied to detailed or
unexpected themes (Strauss, 2001: 28–34). The coded empirical material was
interpreted by establishing relationships between the code categories, which enabled
building of code families and networks. The data that were extracted and organised
were then compressed based on discussions between two of the authors (P.O. and
L.K.). In the writing-up phase, the interpreted data were recontextualised using
fragments of interviews relevant to the conclusions emerging at a higher level of
abstraction. When translating the most problematic citations, the authors received
help from a bilingual researcher. In presenting our findings, we use the principle
of ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973: 3–30) and thus provide multiple citations
representing various perspectives that validate the constructed argument.
3. Results
From the perspective of innovative drug companies, ‘‘Therapeutic programmes
present a great opportunity [in terms of]y the effectiveness of financing.y It
can be expected that the innovative character of a product will play an
important role in convincing decision makers. The chance of being introduced to
a programme is quite high.’’ (1).3
At the time of writing, there were no detailed legal regulations concerning the
development of therapeutic programmes. ‘‘Therapeutic programmes are legal
terra incognita.’’ (2). Our reconstruction of the policy process, based on the
reading of scattered fragments of legislative acts and the interview data, suggests
the existence of considerable space for effective pharmaceutical lobbying. To
start with, the development of a therapeutic programme is initiated from outside
state organisations. ‘‘[The drug company] can approach the Minister informally
and say that there is a topic he should take up and that they have a nice drug.’’ (3).
Alternatively, the establishment of a therapeutic programme may be triggered by
political pressure exerted on the Minister. ‘‘[T]he television shows a sick child
who desperately needs a very expensive drug, and there is pressure on the NHF to
finance this drug.y Later experts from the medical field say that it’s precisely this
drug that should be used because it will help a such and such patient group.’’ (4).
In making reimbursement decisions, the Minister of Health draws on a
recommendation issued by the AHTA, which evaluates drugs in terms of safety,
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness according to the principles of evidence-based
medicine (EBM). However, rarely can such a recommendation provide undis-
putable scientific arguments for reimbursing drugs, given the nature of clinical
and pharmacoeconomic data submitted by drug companies (Sismondo, 2008;
Spielmans and Parry, 2010). ‘‘In half of the research results (submitted by drug
companies), we deal with drugs whose effectiveness cannot be established.
3 We provide the list of quoted interviewees in the Appendix.
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This makes our assessment so difficult.’’ (5). The role of EBM is further diminished
by the incomplete implementation of the EC Transparency Directive (89/105/EEC).
The directive sets the maximum time for taking individual pricing and reimbur-
sement decisions (90 and 180 days, respectively), specifies that they must be based
on ‘objective and verifiable criteria’ and grants the applying firm the right to appeal
to national courts. In Poland, only the first requirement is occasionally met while
the main object of criticism is reimbursement criteria applied by the MoH. ‘‘[They]
are very vague, very general. It’s black magic for us. We don’t know how it
happens, how decisions are taken.’’ (6). Moreover, the existing criteria are unstable
(Najwyz˙sza Izba Kontroli, 2004: 36) and sometimes not applied in practice
(Najwyz˙sza Izba Kontroli, 2004: 30–31). Consequently, ‘‘The Minister takes an
inherently political decision – is a medical problem important or not?’’ (6).
Lastly, negotiations between the MoH, the NHF and drug companies tend to
be entirely informal. ‘‘There is no formal procedure saying that the manu-
facturer approaches [the MoH or the NHF], what happens next, and how he is
included in the process.’’ (2).
In the reminder of the paper, we demonstrate how drug companies exploit
these loopholes in the reimbursement system.
3.1 Informal persuasion
An opaque reimbursement process provides multiple opportunities for informal
persuasion as a lobbying method. ‘‘That the firm comes with scientific evidence
is far from enough. It is the ease of access to particular people that really
counts.’’ (7). What enables informal lobbying are close personal relationships
with decision makers at the MoH, the NHF and the AHTA. ‘‘A lot depends on
his [an official’s] willingness to meet with one or another person. This is all
based on relationships.’’ (7). Therefore, ‘‘[P]harmaceuticals are an extremely
relational, ‘wining and dining industry’. y There are always attempts to
establish personal contact [with decision makers].’’ (1).
The crucial form of informal lobbying is ‘‘the path of mutual favours’’.
‘‘Suppose your mum is very ill and someone helps you ‘arrange’ a good hospital.
You will surely react positively, if this person asks you to read some paperwork.
y The exchange of favours is a debt everyone runs into but eagerly pays off.’’
(8). In particular, a lucrative position in the pharmaceutical sector is a means of
reciprocating past favours granted by a public official. ‘‘X [a former high-
ranking MoH official] used to keep some firms’ reimbursement applications in a
drawer [i.e., delay them]. Having left the MoH, he started working for the firms
whose applications he hadn’t kept there.’’ (9).
Insiders describe informal persuasion as a highly effective lobbying method. For
example, in 2007, a cardiology drug was accepted for reimbursement even though
the scientific evidence behind it was doubtful and the decision-making process
evidently breached formal regulations. The press uncovered that the positive
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reimbursement decision had been preceded by the help that a high-ranking minis-
terial official received from the drug company in ‘arranging a flat’ for his relative.
‘These totally informal relationships very often influence the policy process.’ (10).
Ironically, the widespread conviction about the effectiveness of informal
lobbying stands in stark contrast with the apparently stringent ‘procedure of
receiving external clients’ (procedura przyjmowania kliento´w zewne˛trznych)
established at the MoH (Procedura, 2009). ‘‘We are very cautious against contacts
with the industry which might be perceived as attempts of exerting influence.’’
(11). However, the formal consultations are universally criticised by representa-
tives of drug companies for the long waiting periods, infrequent meetings and
limited topics discussed. Importantly, the ‘procedure of receiving external clients’
is viewed as an instrument limiting access by ‘unfriendly’ drug companies to the
MoH. ‘‘The Polish law is like web: a horsefly will squeeze through yet a bee will
bog down’’ (3; a quotation from a 16th century poet). In fact, formal regulations
are ‘‘Much ado about nothing, really. What they practically mean is that the
Rabbit’s ‘relatives’ and ‘acquaintances’ will met outside [state organisations],
while others are muzzled and can’t communicate.’’ (3).
Our interviews indicate that drug firms lacking close personal connections with
decision-makers rely on endorsements expressed by KOLs, patient organisations
and the media rather than on informal lobbying. ‘‘If the door to the MoH is closed,
the industry searches around and tries to find a place to enter.’’ (12).
3.2 The voice of experts
The most important type of KOLs relevant to Polish drug reimbursement policy
are ‘national consultants’ (konsultanci krajowi) representing 84 fields of medical
and pharmacological specialisation. These prominent experts – professors of
medicine or pharmacology and directors of important clinics – advise the MoH,
the NHF and the AHTA, drawing on their on-the spot clinical experience. ‘‘The
MoH obviously asks the AHTA to assess quantitative data, but this is all in
theory. The MoH very often relies on consultants and asks them if the drug is
really worth reimbursement.’’ (6). National consultants can be remarkably
effective in convincing the Minister about the merits of even controversial
medicines. For instance, in 2008–2009 the national consultant in neonatology
led a successful campaign aimed at the acceptance of a vaccine for Human
Respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) for reimbursement (Jakubiak, 2009a), even
though the drug had received two negative AHTA recommendations stressing
the lack of compelling evidence of its effectiveness.
That said, ‘‘Because of their formal location, national consultants are always
an indispensable element of actions aimed at drug reimbursement.’’ (13). Not
surprisingly, the interviewed national consultants point out their personal
independence from pharmaceutical companies. Notably, they are less emphatic,
however, about the integrity of their colleagues: ‘‘I sometimes observe those
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presentations [at medical congresses], not only in Poland but also abroad. They
are very emotional, saying how wonderful a drug is. I always wonder to what
degree this isy induced by gratification or [results from] deep internal conviction.
y Sometimes, when I listen to acknowledged professors singing praises of a
medicine during a meeting organised by the firm, I keep saying to myself: ‘Gosh,
I would never sell myself like this for any money.’’’ (14).
It is also worthwhile to consider the perspective of an organisation utilising
national consultants’ expertise. ‘‘I have never ever heard X [a national consultant]
expressing a negative opinion about a drug. He is always the greatest enthusiast.
I do not know why that is, but do not think he is such a devotee, so to speak, by
nature. And the more enthusiastic the expert, the greater our scepticism and
uncertainty. But [we] lack good arguments to challenge him.’’ (15). Paradoxically,
attempts to introduce more stringent regulations on national consultants’ conflicts
of interests turned out to be counter-effective. ‘‘We have a big problem with
external experts as many of them don’t want to fill in the declaration of conflicts
of interest. And even if they agree to say who they have worked for, they don’t
want to disclose how much they have been paid.’’ (16).
Consequently, for pharmaceutical companies, ‘‘Achieving KOLs’ support is
vital. We do need to have permanent relationships with them. y This is the
essence of pharmaceutical lobbying.’’ (1). Given the limited number and the
important role of national consultants, ‘‘Firms obviously compete for KOLs’
attention.’’ (13). In doing so, innovative drug companies use a wide array of
instruments key to building the professional status of national consultants. In
particular, invitations to organise clinical trials give them broad access to cut-
ting-edge exclusive medical knowledge through ‘‘regular collaboration with
other KOLs and getting practical knowledge about a drug.’’ (6). Also, because of
their high profitability, ‘‘Clinical trials are the main form of rewarding and
building long-term relationships with national consultants.’’ (11). Finally, ‘‘A
clinical trial, especially a multicenter one, is a real treat for professor X. By
taking part in it he can meet big names from France, the US and the UK. This is
extremely valuable, since his peers in Poland look up to him when his name
appears next to those foreign names in The Lancet or BMJ.’’ (17).
What facilitates establishing close relationships with national consultants is,
first, the fact that the MoH does not adequately reward their professional activity.
‘‘[They] should be attending congresses and visiting clinics in the country but the
state does not provide [them] with funding. So they sometimes take money from
drug companies. It is obviously very hypocritical of politicians to eagerly criticise
relations between national consultants and the industry, whereas they give them
no money.’’ (8). Second, it is the ability of consultants to secure reimbursement
of innovative therapies that largely determines the balance of power between
different medical specialities. ‘‘Doctors’ lobbies are centred on consultants. There
are the very powerful oncological and cardiorogical lobbies. y They win vast
sums of money to finance new, very expensive drugs.’’ (15).
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3.3 Pressure from patients
‘‘In Poland – as opposed to the West – there are considerable problems with access
to drugs. As a result, although Polish patients also organise to provide themselves
with group support, their main goal is lobbying to exercise their rights to health
protection.’’ (6).
The shared interest with drug companies in introducing innovative drugs to
reimbursement is strengthened by the weak financial and organisational resources
available to patients’ organisations. ‘‘[P]ublic grants for patients’ associationsy
are, putting it mildly, very limited. Consequently, they rely on various other forms
of external financial aid. And y this help comes predominantly from drug
companies.’’ (18).
As the imbalance of organisational resources between the two sides is more
evident in Poland than in the UK, pharmaceutical firms find it easier to control
patients’ organisations in the former (Jones, 2008; Solska, 2009). Some drug
companies create patient organisations tailored to specific lobbying campaigns.
‘‘The reimbursement application [concerning a drug for kidney cancer] was
immediately followed by the appearance of the patients’ association.y It could
not have been a coincidence.’’ (3).
Alternatively, drug companies support existing organisations, primarily
through money transfers. ‘‘If the firm pays the association, then it can also draft
its statute.’’ (19). Moreover, drug companies control organisations through
manipulating medical information provided to patients. ‘‘Those people are
indoctrinated and they will pass on what they were led to believe.’’ (20).
Moreover, drug companies orchestrate patient organisations’ lobbying activities.
‘‘They [drug companies] think this way: ‘Since we want to lobby effectively for
our product, we will prepare a letter which will be distributed among the
association’s members to save them the trouble of writing it. We will also
develop an appeal list which you will just sign.’ ’’ (21).
The superior power of pharmaceutical companies is also acknowledged by
representatives of patient organisations. ‘‘Firms support us because we don’t have
another source of income. We try to maintain good relationships with them to get
by.’’ (22). One of a few strategies of restoring independence from drug companies is
diversifying cooperation. ‘‘It is my aim to cooperate with all firms working for
people suffering from diabetes. And I’m very principled about this.’’ (22).
When drug companies have no personal connections to exploit, using patient
organisations as a third party ‘‘is the most effective solution.’’ (8). Specifically, it
enables drug companies to conceal their commercial interests ‘‘under the cover
of defending patients’ rights.’’ (23). Elected politicians find it very difficult to
resist pressure involving potential voters. ‘‘It is said that officials do not react [to
the patients’ pressure]. But ultimately they have to react.’’ (8).
A highly effective lobbying method used by patients’ organisations is ‘‘accessing
the Minister of Health mediated by the medical milieu cooperating with the
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association.’’ (21). On the other hand, KOLs also rely on patients’ political support.
‘‘I protested against them [pharmacotherapy changes proposed by the MoH] and
also asked the patients’ association to express their opinion on this issue. We had
this type of cooperation.’’ (14).
3.4 Engineering media support
‘‘Pharmaceutical lobbying primarily comprises actions in the media and infor-
mational sphere.’’ (11). First, ‘‘Media reports serve as a propaganda machine
which builds the social awareness of the need of a certain drug. This in turn
creates pressure on decision makers aimed at reimbursing this drug.’’ (11).
Second, pharmaceutical firms use the media to generate negative publicity
against decision makers. ‘‘It’s great for a [drug] company when the material is
broadcast during prime-time news releases. It shows a pretty girl who suffers a
lot and loves painting. The only missing thing is the drug.y It can be purchased.
So why don’t do it?’’ (8).
The extreme variant of negative publicity is the uniquely postcommunist
‘kompromat’ campaigns designed to destroy a politician’s reputation (Ledeneva,
2006). For instance, in 2002, a group of innovative drug companies in conflict
with Maciej Łapin´ski, the then Minister of Health, was linked to a series of
publications accusing his closest collaborator of corruption. This eventually
led to the Minister’s dismissal by the Prime Minister. However, a subsequent
Supreme Court ruling stated that the allegations had been unsubstantiated
(Money.pl, 2007). In his book, Łapin´ski recounts: ‘‘I have recently met the boss
of the most effective company in ‘black public relations.’ From what I have
heard, three firms chipped in $3,000,000 to do away with me. It all came down
to buying articles’’ (Łapin´ski, 2005: 108).
Our interviewees indeed mentioned attempts of transferring money to indi-
vidual journalists. ‘‘A lady from a pharmaceutical company called me [once] and
said she would like to order an article with me.y I explained that I didn’t do
such things. I also told her they could provide us with this article and we would
print it as an advertisement.’’ (4). Publications favourable for drug companies
may also result from the fact that ‘‘For the majority of journalists, medicine is
just one of many topics.’’ (8). Therefore, cooperation with journalists sometimes
takes the form of ghost-writing: ‘‘Briefing journalists typically comes down to
providing them with already prepared texts. Firms prefer to give them materials
on a pen drive or a CD, so that the journalist can just do the ‘copy-paste.’ ’’ (8).
‘‘The media and the public spherey are decisive’’ (23) in exerting pressure on
the MoH. Generating media support compensates for the lack of close personal
relationships with decision-makers. ‘‘[F]irms are simply not able to access
everyone. Buty media pressure is strong. The press and television can broadcast
what they want.’’ (11). In addition, using the media enables stealth lobbying.
‘‘Firms handle this with velvet gloves. y Someone passes some materials to a
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friend who approaches another friend who eventually goes to a journalist
with them. The chances to establish who initiated the process are minimal given
that the subsequent links come into play.’’ (13). Using the media is also highly
efficient because ‘‘Sometimes there is a case of one patient which focuses a whole
range of issues [and] can lead to achieving money for the whole therapeutic
group.’’ (8).
Moreover, using the media makes it possible to combine the efforts of ‘third
parties’: national consultants and patients’ organisations. ‘‘During my stay at the
office, there was a problem with drug X: some national consultants were expressing
themselves unreasonably. They did it publically, during press conferences. They
were cited by serious media.’’ [23] Similarly, ‘‘Using media appearances of patients’
organisations isy a very strong lobbying method.’’ (24).
We summarise the relationships between the main pharmaceutical lobbying
methods used in Polish reimbursement policy in Figure 1.
Our interviews also point to two supplementary lobbying methods, which
involve support from two types of ‘influencers’, namely, domestic and foreign
political organisations, which we now discuss.
3.5 Getting around the reimbursement process
Pharmaceutical firms exert indirect pressure on the Minister of Health through
other ministries and members of parliament. For instance, a company may
attempt to convince the Ministry of Economy that reimbursing a particular drug
will positively affect its investment in the Polish pharmaceutical sector. Although
a firm does not manufacture innovative medicines in Poland, ‘‘We are still an
employer who pays taxes and an important partner for the scientific milieu.y
Consequently, the Ministry of Economy understands that it should care for
innovative drug companies.’’ (13). Furthermore, the opinion of the Ministry of
Finance may prove crucial in persuading the Minister of Health that the reim-
bursement of a drug is acceptable financially. ‘‘The element of cooperation with
people responsible for finances and convincing them to support our idea to
reimburse the drug may greatly contribute to the eventual success.’’ (7).
Relationships with decision makers
Informal
lobbying
Key Opinion
Leaders
Patient
organisations
Media
Close Distant 
Figure 1. Key pharmaceutical lobbying methods in Poland
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Drug companies ‘‘expect that lobbying of members of parliament will make
them understand that our problem is crucial and that they will later support our
position before the MoH. We often look for an ‘ambassador’ of a particular pro-
blem among members of parliament.’’ (13). To this end, ‘‘firms take every oppor-
tunity to build relationships with members of parliament.’’ (13). A powerful variant
of this method is disguised money transfers directed to well-connected politicians.
‘‘Someone from a drug company suggested that I should set up a foundation which
could focus on any health-related issuey This conversation clearly suggested that
money wouldn’t be a problem at all, they will obviously provide it.y Their goal
was to access someone with extensive political contacts.y It’s important for them
to influence decision making circles using such soft methods.’’ (10).
Drug companies also use patient organisations as intermediaries in exerting
pressure on members of parliament. ‘‘Firms are cautious. They don’t lobby blatantly.
It’s not a problem to send the president of an [patients’] association instead of going
themselves.’’ (11). Thus, ‘‘Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between their
[members’ of parliament] contacts with firms and those with patients.’’ (11).
Members of parliament use a range of formal powers to facilitate the inclusion
of new drugs in reimbursement. ‘‘I can write to the Minister of Health and ask if the
AHTA is processing this particular application and when the recommendation can
be expected. I’m the intermediary for the [patients’] association. And sometimes the
‘accelerator’ of decisions.’’ (25). The support that members of parliament give to
new therapies is intense: ‘‘Between December 2008 and September 2009 we received
41 [parliamentary] questions concerning long-lasting insulin analogues.’’ (11).
3.6 Playing diplomacy
Lobbying campaigns by multinational pharmaceutical companies’ are often
supported by the governments of their countries of origin. In particular, ‘‘The US
is most active in supporting its firms.’’ (26). This is because ‘‘Drug companies
have great influence on the American government and it can do a lot for them on
the international stage.’’ (27). In doing so, they exploit the fact that the Polish
government strives to attract investment from and maintain positive political
relationships with its key international partner.
First, American drug companies persuade congressmen and high-ranking
officials from the executive branch to offer endorsements to Polish decision-
makers in the MoH. For instance, ‘‘Two congressmen sent us once a letter saying
that we had made a gigantic mistake in not reimbursing a particular drug.y At
present, in the MoH shows less servility to Americans. y But some time ago
when they were coming, one could only hear big ‘Wow!’’’ (28).
Second, the American Embassy in Warsaw and the American–Polish Chamber of
Commerce facilitate access to Polish decision-makers. ‘‘It is often the US Ambas-
sador who brings the firm along for a meeting with the Minister of Health.’’ (29).
The Embassy applies a range of flexible forms of pressure: ‘‘We can send a letter, the
Pharmaceutical lobbying under postcommunism 187
problem gets mentioned in various ways, and governments talk to each other.
Everything depends on the case and the alignment of players. Everything depends
on the issue.’’ (30). ‘‘A personal endorsement by the Embassy does help, since
everyone knows each other in this milieu [people dealing with drug reimbur-
sement]. The Embassy can organise pressure effectively.’’ (27).
4. Discussion
Our investigation of the pharmaceutical lobbying process in Poland has identified
two sets of key lobbying methods: informal persuasion and third-party endorse-
ments. The last of these includes support from KOLs, patients’ organisations and
the media. We also find that the key lobbying methods are supplemented by two
others: reliance on domestic political influencers and foreign diplomatic pressure.
4.1 Strengths and limitations of the study
The strengths of our study include a comprehensive sample of interviewees, an
extensive qualitative dataset, rigorous data analysis and a ‘thick description’ of
our findings.
However, there are some weaknesses. First, given the lack of access to con-
fidential internal documents produced by drug companies and state organisa-
tions, we were unable to corroborate our dataset with other potentially valuable
sources. Second, the highly controversial nature of pharmaceutical lobbying
often prevented our interviewees from providing details of particular lobbying
campaigns. Consequently, our analysis does not systematically juxtapose the
general patterns of pharmaceutical lobbying with lobbying efforts concerning
particular drugs. Finally, similar to other analyses of policymaking from a social
science perspective, our study confronted the fundamental problem of measur-
ing the influence that various stakeholders have on policy decisions. As this
obstacle cannot be entirely resolved either on theoretical or empirical grounds
(Grant, 2000: Ch. 10; Baggot et al., 2005: 21–22), we attempted to address it in
three ways. First, multiple interviews with well-informed participants and
observers of the reimbursement process should have moderated any lack of
knowledge or candour by individual interviewees. Second, the principle of ‘thick
description’ enhanced the validity of our findings (Silverman, 1993: 144–170;
Pera¨kyla¨, 1997). Third, the authors’ discussions throughout the course of the
research, drawing also on our experience outside this study, minimised the
subjectivity of our interpretation.
4.2 Contribution to the research on pharmaceutical lobbying
We offer the first comprehensive analysis of pharmaceutical lobbying methods in a
post-communist country. In Table 3 we outline how the patterns of pharmaceutical
lobbying in Poland compare with these observed in the United Kingdom.
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The literature on pharmaceutical lobbying in the UK has not documented the
widespread use of informal persuasion, which is a pivotal technique used by
drug companies in Poland, contrary to the impression given by observers of its
response to pandemic influenza (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, 2010). This may be considered as part of a broader syndrome of the
prominence of informal institutions in post-communist policymaking (Meyer,
2006). In contrast, in Poland pharmaceutical lobbying using third parties clearly
follows patterns well established in the United Kingdom. What may be unique
about Poland, though, is the exceptionally high level of control exercised by
drug companies, especially over KOLs and patient organisations. This stems
from the imbalance of economic resources between multinational drug com-
panies and other actors in the drug reimbursement policy domain. Lastly, our
analysis suggests that two types of ‘political influencers’, that is, cabinet min-
isters and diplomatic representations, may be used more extensively in Poland
than in the United Kingdom. This is likely to result from, on the one hand, the
weak position of the MoH within the Polish executive, and on the other Poland’s
relationships with more powerful economic and political partners.
Clearly, the lobbying methods described here should not be seen in isolation.
‘‘Lobbying takes place on multiple levels. In drug reimbursement, there are no
simple mechanisms.’’ (8). Furthermore, ‘‘Coordination and links between various
types of actions are crucial.’’ (31). Thus, the methods are joined in a complex
lobbying process, making it possible to ‘outflank’ the policymakers (Ferner and
McDowell, 2006). In conclusion, in contrast to what has been suggested in relation
to drug approval, Poland is not unique.
4.3 Policy implications
We believe that the Polish reimbursement process is in need of comprehensive
reform to moderate the impact of pharmaceutical lobbying. On the basis of
the analysis presented in this article, we propose five broad directions for
institutional change.
Table 3. Comparison of pharmaceutical lobbying methods in the United Kingdom and in Poland
Methods of pharmaceutical lobbying United Kingdom Poland
Essential Third-party endorsements Key Opinion Leaders Yes Yes
Patients’ organisations Yes Yes
Media Yes Yes
Informal persuasion No Yes
Supplementary Political influencers Cabinet ministers No Yes
Members of Parliament Yes Yes
Diplomatic pressure No Yes
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First, it is necessary to introduce effective regulation of consultations between
the MoH and drug companies, in line with the EC Transparency Directive. Such
reform should increase formal access by drug companies to state organisations,
while also minimising informal contacts. We contend that this effect can be
achieved not only through penalties but also by means of offering pharmaceu-
tical firms powerful incentives, such as timely, inclusive and comprehensive
consultations, to comply with formal regulations. Crucially, the burden of the
regulations should be shared by both drug companies and the state organisations
involved in the reimbursement process.
Second, it is vital to ensure independent medical advice to policymakers.
Enhancing the role of professional bodies in selecting national consultants
(Ustawa, 2009) could be a step in this direction. This should, nonetheless, be
coupled with instruments increasing the transparency and effective monitoring of
consultants’ conflicts of interests. At the same time, the MoH should adequately
reward consultants for their expertise, thereby supporting their independence
from drug companies.
Third, we see the need for the institutionalisation of the role of patient
organisations in the reimbursement process. Introducing a requirement to dis-
close sources of funding as a precondition of consultations with the Minister is a
possible solution (Jakubiak, 2009b). What has been overlooked so far, however,
is strengthening of patient organisations through public grants. As in the case of
national consultants, only sufficient support from the state may curb drug
companies’ domination of patient organisations.
Fourth, one way of constraining the impact of media campaigns and, more
broadly, short-term political considerations on reimbursement policy, is by
strengthening the position of the AHTA vis-a`-vis the Minister of Health. Under
present regulations, the Minister exerts tight control over the AHTA primarily
through budgeting, nominations and an administrative procedure of accepting its
expert positions before they become official recommendations. These institutional
arrangements encourage ministerial attempts to secure the AHTA recommenda-
tions that enable avoiding political blame for decisions that are either unpopular
or not sufficiently grounded in EBM (Hood, 2011). What seems to be crucial to
restoring the balance between the politics and science of drug reimbursement is
an increase in the organisational resources, institutional independence and, not
least, the prestige of the AHTA. Only then may EBM become a real basis for
reimbursement decisions.
Lastly, we argue that the intersection between drug reimbursement policy
and pharmaceutical industrial policy should be more transparent. In reality, it is
unavoidable that the Minister of Health also considers the possible implications of
a reimbursement decision for investment by multinational drug companies and, on
the other hand, profitability of local generic producers (cf. Abraham, 2009: 947).
We contend that making the MoH’s economic considerations more explicit will be
conducive to decreasing the opacity of pressures from other ministries or states.
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At least some of the suggestions outlined above may be addressed by a reform
of the reimbursement policy that is currently being considered by the Polish
parliament (Rynek Zdrowia, 2010). Most importantly, it is hoped that the
reform will increase compliance of reimbursement regulations with the EC
Transparency Directive by introducing clear criteria. However, the actual effects
of the reform, if successfully enacted, can only be evaluated in the longer term.
4.4 Future research
Future research should provide an evaluation of the effectiveness of pharmaceutical
lobbying. One approach would be a cross-national comparison of pharmaceutical
reimbursement decisions and corresponding lobbying campaigns.
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Appendix. Cited interviewees
Position Organisation
Interviewee
code
Free-lance lobbyist Self-employed 1
Partner Law firm 2
Former high-ranking official Agency for Health Technology Assessment 3
Journalist Newspaper specialising in public health 4
High-ranking official National Health Fund 5
Spokesperson Drug company 6
Communications manager Drug company 7
President Lobbying firm 8
Former middle-ranking official Ministry of Health 9
Member of Parliament Parliament 10
High-ranking official Ministry of Health 11
Partner Law firm 12
Key account manager Drug company 13
National consultant Advising MoH 14
High-ranking official Agency for Health Technology Assessment 15
High-ranking official Agency for Health Technology Assessment 16
Journalist High-circulation weekly newspaper 17
Former Vice-Minister Ministry of Health 18
Communications manager Drug company 19
National consultant Advising Ministry of Health 20
Former Minister Ministry of Health 21
President Association of patients with diabetes 22
Former Minister Ministry of Health 23
High-ranking official Ministry of Health 24
Member of Parliament Parliament 25
Representative Association of innovative drug companies 26
Representative Chamber of commerce involving pharmaceutical
companies
27
Former middle-ranking official Ministry of Health 28
Former high-ranking official Ministry of Health 29
Diplomat American Embassy 30
High-ranking official Ministry of Health 31
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